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Abstract. Data-driven security has become essential in many organisa-
tions in their attempt to tackle Cyber security incidents. However, whilst
the dominant approach to data-driven security remains through the min-
ing of private and internal data, there is an increasing trend towards more
open data through the sharing of Cyber security information and expe-
rience over public and community platforms. However, some questions
remain over the quality and quantity of such open data. In this paper, we
present the results of a recent case study that considers how feasible it is
to answer a common question in Cyber security incident investigations,
namely that “in an incident, who did what to which asset or victim, and
with what result and impact”, for one such open Cyber security database.
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1 Introduction
When designing a security system, data and information are imperative to cre-
ating the best solution. Most organisations will collect and analyse data from
their own systems and use these and the experience, as well as the knowledge of
the personnel involved, to design a security strategy. Cyber security practitioners
working in an increasingly competitive environment face the challenge of provid-
ing security that is focused in the areas that threaten their business the most to
reduce crime and loss. Because most organisations have limited resources, espe-
cially the smaller ones, the solution needs to be cost effective without exposing
the organisations to unwarranted liability or embarrassment. Data-driven secu-
rity, therefore, can help expose hidden patterns of errant behaviour and offer
credible countermeasures and effective controls at such a cost effective level.
This obviously has restrictions, and a broader and deeper knowledge of secu-
rity threats can mean a more robust and effective security system. At the same
time, organisations can benefit from the combined knowledge, experience and
competences of a wider community in order to improve their understanding of
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the risks that they may be facing. Sharing threat information through a com-
munity database enables organisations to do just this. By exploiting this shared
knowledge, organisations can make more informed decisions to improve their
own defences, threat detection practises and mitigation strategies. By collecting
and analysing Cyber threat information from multiple sources, an organisation
can also enrich existing information and make it more actionable [8]. In recent
times, there has emerged a wealth of open data sources to assist Cyber security
strategists in understanding systems and threats against them. Notable exam-
ples include SecRepo [11], VERIS/VCDB [18, 19], CERT’s Vulnerability Notes
Database at Carnegie Mellon University [5], CAIDA [4], UNSW-NB15 [13] and
the open datasets from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [10]. As
a result, data-driven security has emerged as a paradigm that uses such data
sources effectively to manage the ever-changing risk landscape organisations op-
erate in.
Nonetheless, a very important question in any data-driven technique is the
quality of the dataset under consideration. This question is particularly critical
in the context of Cyber security data, as was demonstrated recently for example
in [9]. We aim in this paper to study this question through the analysis of the
quantity of data in an example Cyber security dataset collected by Verizon
[18]. Our approach focuses on identifying and extracting information from such
dataset relevant to a fundamental question in Cyber incidents analysis, namely:
“in an incident, who did what to which asset or victim, and with what result
and impact”. Our findings show that while organisations are generally happy to
report data for the majority of the elements of this question, they are particularly
reluctant to report data related to the impact of Cyber incidents.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related
work in literature where the problem of the quality of security data in open
datasets has been tackled. In Section 3, we give an overview of the dataset used
in our case study, namely the VERIS schema and dataset [18, 19]. In Section 4,
we describe the methodology used in extracting the sub-schema relevant to our
research question highlighted above. In Section 5, we outline this scheme, and
in Section 6, we present the results of our quantity of data analysis. Finally, in
Section 7, we conclude the paper and outline directions for future research.
2 Related Work
Open Cyber security datasets, such as the ones we mentioned in the Introduction,
are becoming increasingly popular, and as highlighted in [14], there is growing
trend in encouraging the generation of such datasets. For example, [6] proposed
ID2T, a DIY dataset creation toolkit for Cyber security incident detection. An-
other example of a data-driven security management approach was described in
[3], who proposed a method for integrating security system data with systems
engineering principles, in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of security
systems being designed and implemented and to balance risk, effectiveness and
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cost. The method also proposes that human intelligence should not be ignored
as a compliment to technological intelligence.
Whilst a few studies have been conducted to investigate the quality of data
in more general datasets (e.g. for Wikidata and DBpedia as in [17] and more
general, for any linked open data as in [20]), there is still no significant research
effort done to understand the quantity of Cyber security data available. Per-
haps the most interesting such research so far has been the work of [16], who
proposed semiotic levels as a theoretical basis for the definition of data quality
in the context of information systems security. For example, the relationship
between data and information is an interpretation-related quality, which would
affect security operations (e.g. confidentiality, integrity and availability controls),
whereas that between information and knowledge is a usefulness-related quality,
which in turn would affect decision-making processes (e.g. when enforcing secu-
rity policies.) On the other hand, the authors in [7, 15] proposed an approach
that improves the sharing of Cyber security information through understanding
the requirements and constraints underlying the collaborative system.
The work presented in this paper is based on current research effort by the
authors, who in [1] demonstrated how open datasets can be effectively used to
extract useful information for predicting features of future incidents. Similarly,
in [2], the authors demonstrated how open data can be used to evaluate and
reason about XACML [12] security policies based on risk probabilities, which
offer a quantitative approach to security. However, none of the above works
attempted to provide some understanding of the quality or quantity of data in
Cyber security-related datasets or platforms.
3 VERIS: A Schema for Cyber Security Incidents
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) [18] is a
dataset and schema defining a set of metadata and metrics for describing Cyber
security incidents. It is currently considered a leading provider of open quality
information in the IT security domain and provides a framework that organi-
sations can use to collect and share information on security incidents in a re-
sponsible and anonymous manner, with the aim of constructing a ground on
which researchers and experts in the IT security industry can cooperate to learn
from their knowledge and experiences. The VERIS schema itself consists of five
general categories, containing descriptions of security incidents:
– Incident Tracking : this category contains general information about the inci-
dents, for example, the source identity, summary of the incident and whether
the incident is related to other incidents.
– Victim demographies: this category contains information related to the organ-
isation being affected by the incident, for example, its country of operation,
number of employees, revenue and industry type.
– Incident description: this category contains information related to the question
of “who did what to what (or whom) with what result”. It is based on the so-
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called A4 threat model developed by Verizon and contains descriptions related
to the Actors, Assets, Actions and Attributes (A4) of an incident.
– Discovery and response: this category contains information related to the in-
cident’s timeline, its discovery method, root causes and corrective actions.
– Impact assessment : this last category contains information on loss categorisa-
tion and estimation and impact rating.
The significance of the VERIS dataset lies in the fact that it is a community-based
dataset. This means that its data are collected from a wide range of industries
and varied over different types and sizes of organisations, therefore providing a
rich ground for organisations to learn about the various risks and threats that
could exist on a global level. This renders the dataset more widely applicable
than datasets that are generated in the context of single organisations. The
VERIS dataset, known as VCDB [19], had at the time the work reported in this
paper was carried out 7834 recorded incidents between 2010 and 2017, with its
schema metadata described by some 2398 elements. Both the VERIS framework
as well as the VCDB dataset are initiatives by the Verizon RISK team.
4 Data Extraction Methodology
Before evaluating the quantity of information available in VERIS to answer our
research question, we can summarise our methodology used in extracting the
relevant data by the diagram shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Our Data Extraction Methodology
This methodology comprises the following eight steps:
1. Download the dataset file, in this case “VCDB.csv”. We used the version as of
15 March 2018, which contained 7834 records and 2398 fields, covering years
2010 to 2017.
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2. Clean the file, as the file contained many non-standard characters, which had
to be removed so that they would not interfere with the loading process. This
was done manually in a basic text editor using find and replace.
3. Split the file, since there were 2398 fields in the file, these needed to be split
into multiple files in order to make it possible for the data analysis server to
process them. This step was performed using a VB.NET script. We used the
Microsoft SQLServer Integration Services to perform this step.
4. Create a database, where we used the SQL Server database management stu-
dio system to create a database named VCDB, in order to receive the data
from the newly created files.
5. Import data into the databse, where each file was imported into separate tables
in the new VCDB database, each table having the name of the file from which
the data came.
6. Transpose multiple fields, as many of the fields in the dataset are binary data
that can be transposed into a single data field. For example, when asking if
the ACTOR is of External, Internal or Partner type, the dataset uses 3 fields
namely [actor#External], [actor#Internal] or [actor#Partner], each with a
binary (i.e. True/False) value. One can instead optimise this into a single field
with the three values (Internal, External or Partner).
7. Create tables for each entity, where we focused on the entities selected for the
sub-schema. Each table contained also descriptions of the different records.
8. Data selection, which is the final step leading to our extracted sub-schema
(described in the next section).
5 The Extracted Sub-Schema
In order to answer the question “in an incident, who did what to which asset
or victim, and with what result and impact”, we next need to identify the rel-
evant part of the VERIS schema that contains enough information to answer
the question. This information can be summarised in terms of the following four
categories:
1. Incidents information, which captures some general information related to an
incident, such as the various identifiers, date the incident occurred on, levels
of confidence and so on.
2. A4 information, which represents information related to the A4 model (i.e.
Actors, Actions, Assets and Attributes.)
3. Victims information, which is information related to the victims of the inci-
dent, the industry, organisation, revenue and country of the victim.
4. Impact information, which is essential information describing the impact of
the incident, e.g. loss type, rating and overall amount.
More specifically, the sub-scheme of VERIS corresponding to these categorites of
information is shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, Table 1 defines how the mapping
between our research statement concepts and the seven VERIS types captured
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Fig. 2: The extracted sub-schema
in the sub-schema is done, indicating at the same time possible values for some
of the sub-types of information in each type.
6 Quantity of Data Analysis
After identifying the relevant categories of information as outlined above in the
extracted sub-schema, we next carried out an analysis to measure the amount
of information for each element of this sub-schema. After filtering the original
dataset of incorrectly inputted records, we ended up with 7210 records. For each
of the seven elements of the extracted sub-schema, we measured the percentage
of cases that had populated that element over the total number of cases. The
results are shown in Tables 2-8 for the extracted schema.
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Table 1: Mapping between research statement concepts and VERIS types
Statement Concept VERIS Type Possible Values
Incident INCIDENTS Confirmed, Suspect
False positive, Near miss
Who ACTORS External, Internal, Partner
What ACTIONS Hacking, Malware, Misuse
Physical, Error, Social
Environmental
Asset ASSETS Server, Network, User device
Media, People,
Kiosk/Public Terminal




Impact IMPACT Impact assessment information
The first four tables, Tables 2-5, represent the quantity of information avail-
able in the A4 (i.e. Actors, Actions, Assets and Attributes) category. We found
here that there was an abundance of data; Actors at 97%, Actions at 100%,
Assets at 90% and Attributes at 97%. All percentages out of the 7210 records.
Therefore, we were able to answer the sub-question “who did what to which asset
and with what result” for about 90% of the incidents reported correctly.
In terms of the lack of data, we found that for the Actor category, the least
populated data items were those related to their identity (10%), sources and
capabilities of the actor (38%) and whether they had an internal job change (2%).
For the Actions category, we found that the least populated data items were those
related to the malware names (2.5%), CVEs exploited by the action (1%), results
(3.6%) and social target (2.5%). For the Assets category, we found that the least
populated data items were those related to the management and hosting of assets
(0%), the accessibility of the assets (0.14%), whether the asset is a Cloud service
(0.24%) and what the total amount of the assets was (3.3%). Finally, for the
Attributes category, the least populated data item was the duration of the effect
of loss or exposure (3%).
Table 6 shows the quantity of information in the VICTIM category. We
found that this category of information was well-populated generally, with infor-
mation supplied for at least 56% of cases, except for information related to the
annual revenue of victims (7%), which can be sometimes sensitive information
particularly for the case of privately-owned companies. We noticed that the least
populated set of data were those belonging to the IMPACT category, shown in
Table 7. Most of the fields had fewer than 1% reported data. Finally, for the
category of INCIDENTS information, shown in Table 8, the most notable as-
pect was the hesitance of organisations to report their levels of confidence in the
supplied data. Only 8.5% of cases reported any level of confidence.
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Table 2: Quantity of ACTORS Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
ACTOR varchar Internal, External or Partner 97.00%
NAME nvarchar Name or ID of Actor 19.00%
TYPE varchar Defines resources and capabilities of
capabilities of ACTOR 38.00%
NOTES nvarchar Extra information 10.00%
MOTIVE varchar Helps to understand intensions 50.00%
INT JOB CHANGE varchar Had the employee recently changed job? 2.00%
PRTN INDUSTRY/ varchar Type of industry of partner
IES US Census NIACS codes 3.50%
Table 3: Quantity of ACTIONS Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
ACTION varchar Primary Threat Action 100.00%
TYPE varchar What varieties or functions or methods
of Primary action were involved 71.00%
Malware Name nvarchar Common name or strain of the Malware 2.50%
Action Vector varchar What were the vectors or
paths of infection or attack 60.00%
NOTES nvarchar Enter any additional details deemed
noteworthy 8.60%
CVE nvarchar Any CVEs exploited by this Action (1) 1.00%
Results varchar Exfiltrate, Exfiltrate or elevate 3.60%
Social Target varchar Who was the target of these social tactics 2.50%
Table 4: Quantity of ASSETS Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
ASSET varchar Asset Category 90.00%
TYPE varchar Specific type of asset 93.00%
Notes nvarchar Enter any additional details deemed
noteworthy 2.20%
Governance varchar Who owns / governs the asset 10.00%
Management varchar Who manages the asset 0.00%
Hosting varchar Where (physically) is the asset hosted 0.00%
Accessibility varchar How accessible is the asset 0.14%
Cloud varchar If a cloud service what type is it 0.24%
Total amount nvarchar Total amount of assets of type affected 3.30%
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Table 5: Quantity of ATTRIBUTES Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
ATTRIBUTE varchar Confidentiality, Integrity 97.00%
and Availability (CIA)
TYPE nvarchar What was the nature of
integrity/authenticity loss 89.00%
Duration varchar Duration of effect of loss or exposure 3.00%
Data Disclosure varchar Was non-public data disclosed 89.00%
Data Victim varchar Who was the victim within the
organisation. 62.70%
Data State nvarchar State of data when disclosed 47.00%
Total Data nvarchar Number of records affected 56.00%
Notes nvarchar Enter any additional details deemed
noteworthy 10.60%
Table 6: Quantity of VICTIM Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
VICTIM ID nvarchar Identifier or name of victim 96.00%
Industry nvarchar Industry 100.00%
Industry Code float industry (NAICS code) 100.00%
Organization Size varchar Large or small 67.50%
Employee Count varchar Number of employees 60.00%
Revenue nvarchar Annual revenue of the victim 7.00%
Total Data nvarchar Number of records affected 56.00%
Notes nvarchar Enter any additional
details deemed noteworthy 0.80%
Victim Country varchar Country of operation 98.00%
Country Code varchar ISO3166-1 two digit country code 98.00%
Table 7: Quantity of IMPACT Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
Loss Type varchar Specific category of loss 0.00%
Loss Rating varchar Qualitative rating of impact 0.00%
Overall Rating varchar Qualitative rating of overall impact 0.35%
Overall Amount decimal Most likely estimated money amount 0.83%
Notes nvarchar Enter any additional details
deemed noteworthy 1.66%
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Table 8: Quantity of INCIDENTS Information
Column Data Description Percentage
Name Type Populated
ROW − ID float Unique Row ID 100.00%
ACTOR− ID float ACTOR Row ID 100.00%
ACTION − ID float ACTION Row ID 100.00%
ASSET − ID float ASSET Row ID 100.00%
ATTRIBUTE − ID float ATTRIBUTE Row ID 100.00%
V ICTIM − ID float V ICTIM −Row − ID 100.00%
IMPACT − ID float IMPACT Row ID 100.00%
Incident− ID nvarchar To uniquely identify incidents 100.00%
for storage and tracking over time
Incident Date date Date the incident occurred 97.00%
Security Incident varchar Was this a confirmed security incident?
Confirmed, suspect, false 99.80%
positive or near miss
Confidence varchar How certain are you that the information 8.50%
you provided about
this incident is accurate?
High, Medium, Low or None
Summary nvarchar Brief summary of the incident. 93.40%
Reference nvarchar URL or internal ticketing system ID 94.00%
Notes nvarchar Enter any additional details
deemed noteworthy 5.30%
7 Conclusion
Since data-driven security management effectively helps organisations to under-
stand their situations in terms of Cyber security, extracting knowledge from
Cyber security datasets has been a crucial point in recent years towards this
understanding. In this paper, we have given a representation of understanding
if and to what extent useful free community Cyber security datasets can be to
organisations when developing a Cyber security plan. We also showed the possi-
bility of answering the fundamental question, “in an incident, who did what to
which asset or victim, and with what result and impact”, with a subset of the
VCDB dataset. A quantitative analysis was given, which measured the amount
of information for each element of the extracted sub-scheme corresponding to
the above question.
As a result, one can roughly illustrate quantity of information present in the
















The significance of these results lies in the wider context of risk analysis. Risk is
often defined as the product of the probability of a bad event happening and the
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impact of that event. Whilst the amount of information available in answering
the majority of the above question helps calculate the probability part of risk,
we find that we are quite poorly informed about the impact part.
For future research, we plan to apply more statistical calculations to the
VERIS dataset, in particular to measure not just the quantity of information but
also its quality. In fact, one important step is to develop open source tools that
would automate such evaluations. We also plan to perform similar analyses for
other open datasets, such as [4, 5, 11, 13], and also importantly, for proprietary
(non-open) data that would be more company-specific.
We consider this kind of research as initial experiments towards a more formal
framework for evaluating quantity and quality of open data, where we would
define a methodology for performing such evaluations.
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